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The Morauta Government, coming to office with high hopes
two years ago, has seen the economy do very poorly in 2001.
This poor performance has occurred despite strong efforts by
the government to improve the economic environment
through reform of institutions and policies. While the
economy did well in 2000, in 2001 real GDP is likely to show
no growth and could even decline by 2–3 per cent, especially if
global economic conditions deteriorate as widely expected.
Papua New Guinea’s creditworthiness has also been
downgraded. The reasons for the seeming collapse in
confidence in the economy are not easy to pinpoint.
The Morauta Government has been in office
for a little more than two years. Great
expectations for the government have been
held by international financial agencies,
concerned donor governments and Papua
New Guineans themselves. It is almost
certainly true that behind many of these
expectations there was not sufficient
recognition of the obstacles and risks that
the new government faced. In setting out to
evaluate the performance of the Morauta
administration, therefore, this survey tries to
give sufficient recognition to the difficulties
faced by the government in its attempts to
improve the country’s performance.
Two years is obviously a very short
period within which to bring about major
changes in the management of the PNG
economy. It is also a very short period over
which to evaluate a government’s
performance. Two years is also a short period
in terms of the availability of data with which
to make an assessment of the government’s
performance and its impacts. Production
data such as GDP do not become firm for
several years after the event, so it is not
possible to judge the performance of the
Morauta administration in terms of output
and employment effects. Hence, this survey
mainly relies on what might be called current
prices, such as the exchange rate, the
consumer price index (CPI), interest rates,
and even share prices, as well as other
indicators of economic agents’ perceptions
of the economy. These prices essentially
convey the market’s real-time evaluation of
the administration’s performance and its
impact, even into the future.
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When the Morauta administration took
over in July 1999, the budget was in
substantial deficit, public debt was over
K5,700 million, interest rates on Treasury Bills
were around 22 per cent for 28-day bills and
26.5 per cent for 182-day bills, the Bank of
Papua New Guinea’s international reserves
were valued at K228.3 million—equivalent
to only 1.9 months’ import cover—and the
kina had depreciated substantially against
the currencies of Papua New Guinea’s major
trading partners. The nominal exchange rate
for the kina fell from US¢70 in 1997 to US¢29
before the change of government (Papua New
Guinea 2000). 1 The kina’s decline was
obviously related to fiscal and monetary
measures that had resulted in inflation in 1999
running at a rate of more than 13 per cent.
In attempting to stabilise the economy,
the Morauta administration’s main short-
run objectives have been to reduce the fiscal
deficit and to reduce the level of public
indebtedness and thereby reduce pressure
on interest rates. To improve the
government’s long-run performance, its main
focus has been on improving the
government’s management, regulatory and
oversight capacity. In addition, it has been
trying to reduce the tasks that the government
has been attempting to undertake and to
focus its attention on core activities. One way
in which the government is attempting both
to reduce public debt and reduce the tasks of
government is to privatise many of the
publicly owned and run enterprises. More
generally, it has also pledged to provide a
more market-friendly environment for
investors. An important part of its efforts to
bring about greater fiscal and monetary
discipline was to give greater independence
to the central bank, the Bank of Papua New
Guinea, through the new Central Banking
Act of June 2000.
The Supplementary Budget of August
1999 and the 2000 Budget resulted in the 2000
fiscal deficit being slightly reduced from
2.2 per cent of GDP at the end of 1999 to an
estimated 1.8 per cent at the end of 2000. The
2001 fiscal deficit is projected to be 1.3 per
cent (Papua New Guinea 2000). In November
1999 the government approved a Structural
Reform Program (SRP) that was endorsed by
the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The SRP incorporated
reforms required by the international
financial agencies as conditions for their
support, such as improving central branch
independence, strengthening supervision of
financial institutions, reforming the public
service and privatising public enterprises.
The SRP led to a total financial
commitment to Papua New Guinea of
US$300 million by the World Bank, the IMF,
Australia and Japan. Partly as a result, the
Bank of Papua New Guinea’s holdings of
gold and foreign exchange increased to
K625.5 million by June 2000—representing
three months’ import cover. The kina also
increased in value against major currencies.
This was due in part to a sharp reduction in
broad money (M2) growth from 17 per cent
in 1998 to 4 per cent in 1999. Inflation also
fell, but only slightly, from 13.2 per cent in
1999 to an estimated 12.3 per cent in 2000.
The reduced fiscal deficit in 2000,
together with the reduction in domestic
public debt (to K1,775 million at the end of
June 2000), took some pressure off interest
rates. As a result, interest rates on Treasury
Bills fell throughout 2000. Real GDP grew
by 3.2 per cent in 1999 but is estimated to
have grown by only 0.8 per cent in 2000
(Papua New Guinea 2000). The decline in
the growth rate in 2000 was expected due to
falling production in the oil sector, with the
mining sector GDP declining by 7.9 per cent
while the remainder of the economy grew by
3.3 per cent.
The 2001 Budget
The objectives of the 2001 Budget were to
• maintain a responsible fiscal stance and
thereby reduce the fiscal deficit, slow the
rate of increase in public indebtedness,
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reduce interest rates and stabilise the
exchange rate
• shift resources towards priority sectors
that will foster development (health,
education, transport, works, agriculture,
and police and correctional services).
While it is said that the government’s
objective is to tightly control expenditure,
salaries and wages were expected to increase
by K687 million to ‘repair some of the decline
in the real wages of government employees’
(Papua New Guinea 2000:15). It was said
that this increase in wages and salaries
would be offset in the future by the
retrenchment of 1,380 public servants, saving
over K20 million per year. But its initial
impact would be negative.
No new domestic borrowing was
expected. Instead, it was proposed to pay
down K268.9 million of domestic debt using
international concessional loans and
proceeds from privatisation (K178 million).
However, to assist with the retirement of
public debt, external finance of US$140
million from concessional lenders was
planned for. The projected budget deficit for
2001 was K141 million, which was an
estimated 1.3 per cent of GDP, compared to
an estimated 1.8 per cent for 2000.
Total revenue and grants for 2001 were
estimated to increase by 6 per cent to K3,223.3
million, with tax revenue growing by 7.1 per
cent and reflecting ‘improving economic
activity, greater tax arrears collection efforts,
greater tax compliance enforcement efforts
and higher levels of personal income’ (Papua
New Guinea 2000). Personal income taxes
were expected to increase by 15 per cent, due
to wages growth and increased domestic
activity. Corporate tax was also expected to
increase, rising by 10.3 per cent due to the
expected increase in economic activity. On
the other hand, mineral and petroleum tax
receipts were expected to fall by 20 per cent
(from K393.9 million to K316.7 million) due
to the continuing decline in petroleum
production and the expected fall-off from the
high oil prices. Log export taxes were
expected to increase only slightly due to a
small expected increase in log prices.
Real GDP was expected to increase by
3.1 per cent in 2001, with non-mining GDP
increasing by 5.7 per cent but with the mining
and quarrying sector declining further by
6.5 per cent. This expected decline was
mainly due to the expected 17 per cent decline
in oil output.
2001 revenue forecasts
Making sensible forecasts of future
government revenues is an important part of
good government management, as is
management of fluctuations in the various
revenue streams. Over-estimation of future
revenues can lead to chronic budget deficits
just as can poor control of government
expenditures or poor management of the
government’s contingent liabilities.
An assessment of the government’s
performance with respect to the forecasts of
future revenues should recognise that, on the
one hand, forecasts of volumes and prices
are highly uncertain and therefore mistakes
will be made. On the other hand, the forecasts
should recognise the inherent uncertainty
and be appropriately cautious.
From this perspective it appears that the
government has not been sufficiently aware
of the problems inherent in forecasting
revenues or not sufficiently careful in making
the forecasts. For example, with the
exceptions of gold and oil prices, all
commodity export prices were forecast to
increase in 2001 (in kina terms for the non-
mineral commodities and in US dollar terms
for copper) (Table 1).
Up to July 2001, however, only
international cocoa and log prices have
increased in kina terms, while copper prices
fell in US dollar terms (Table 2). All US dollar
prices of the commodities in Table 2 have
fallen in 2001—except cocoa—with copra,
coffee, palm oil and logs registering large
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falls. So large, in fact, that the large
depreciation of the kina in terms of US dollars
has not offset the fall. Thus, we see that the
kina prices for copra, coffee and palm oil have
been very poorly forecast, as was the US
dollar price of copper. If the widely expected
decline in the US economy takes place, US
dollar commodity prices, especially for
industrial commodities, could fall further.
Moreover, the US dollar could depreciate
against other currencies. Hence, kina prices
of primary commodities could decline even
further this year.
Total GDP was expected to increase in
real terms in 2001 by 3.1 per cent. With the
agricultural, forestry and fishing sector
accounting for one-third of nominal GDP, the
forecast 6.5 per cent increase in real GDP in
this sector was the main contributor to the
expected aggregate GDP growth. Hence
the output and price assumptions for this
sector are critical. With the exceptions of tea
and logs, output in all agricultural export
sectors was expected to increase (Table 3).
This increase would likely have been based,
in part, on the expected increases in export
Table 1 Prices of main export commodities, 1999–2001 (kina per ton f.o.b.,
unless otherwise specified)
1999 2000 2001
(actual) (est.) (proj.)
Copra 1,047 808 848
Cocoa 2,917 2,461 2,915
Coffee 5,220 4,351 4,981
Palm oil 1,331 1,002 1,237
Logs (kina/m3) 195 217 246
Gold (US$/oz) 279 274 268
Copper (US$/lb) 0.71 0.85 0.91
Oil (US$/barrel) 17.8 28.7 27.7
Sources: Papua New Guinea, 2000. Economic and Development Policies, Vol. 1, 2001 Budget, Government of
Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby:Table 3.
Table 2 World Bank commodity prices, 1999–2001 (kina per metric ton, unless
otherwise specified)
1999 2000 2001
(Jan–July)
Copra 1,176.7 841.3 605.2
Cocoa 2,893.9 2,500.7 3,273.0
Coffee, arabica 5,841.4 5,299.5 4,655.0
Palm oil 1,111.7 856.5 838.3
Logs, Malaysia (kina/m3) 477.1 524.4 536.4
Gold (US$/oz) 278.8 279.0 270.0
Copper (US$/mt) 1,573.0 1,813.0 1,681.0
Oil, Brent (US$/barrel) 17.8 28.27 26.3
Sources: World Bank and IMF Commodity Price Data. Monthly prices in US$ converted to kina at average
US$/kina monthly exchange rates.
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prices. It may be that the forecasts of
agricultural export activity were reasonable
expectations, at the time, however, the
optimism of forecasts for this sector contrasts
with the realism of the forecasts of output and
prices for the minerals and oil sectors. The
forecast for log volumes of no change was
probably determined as much by compliance
with World Bank strictures on activity in this
sector as much as anything else. The poorer-
than-expected activity in the agricultural and
mining sectors will likely be reflected in other
sectors, adversely affecting the income and
corporate tax collections—as is already
evident from reported revenue collections for
the first half of 2001.
It is likely too that the government’s
expected take from its 51 per cent share of
Orogen Minerals Ltd was optimistic (Orogen
paid US$44.4 million in tax in 2000). Orogen
Minerals Ltd reported a 27 per cent decline
in first-half year earnings for 2001 as
compared to 2000 (Post Courier, 21 August
2001). Total revenue in the first half of the
year 2001 was US$89 million, as compared
to US$119.2 million in the same period in
2000. It was claimed that the drop in earnings
was linked to the delays in the finalisation
of the PNG–Queensland gas pipeline
proposal and in the Ramu nickel project.
However, it is difficult to see how earnings
from these projects could have been factored
into year 2001 earnings. It is more likely that
anticipated lower gold and oil earnings were
not properly accounted for.
Clearly reflecting an appreciation of the
poorer-than-expected performance across
the economy, the Governor of the Bank of
Papua New Guinea recently revised the 2001
GDP growth rate down from the 2001 Budget
forecast of 3.1 per cent to 0.1 per cent
(Australian Financial Review, 2 August 2001).
The Prime Minister was reported to have told
Parliament that the slow growth of the
economy was due to the delayed release of a
US$20 million World Bank loan. But it is clear
from the 2001 Budget papers that the GDP
growth forecast was optimistic. The
optimism might well have been justified if
there had been greater surety about a
reduction in Papua New Guinea’s sovereign
risks.
Table 3 Volume of main export commodities, 1999–2001 (‘000 tons, unless otherwise specified)
1999 2000 2001
(actual) (est.) (proj.)
Copra 63.5 68.0 71.4
Cocoa 29.0 45.0 48.6
Coffee 79.2 50.5 66.0
Palm oil 253.8 300.0 515.0
Rubber 3.7 3.2 4.0
Tea 8.2 7.0 7.0
Copra oil 50.3 41.9 43.9
Logs (‘000 m3) 1,312.3 1,500.0 1,500.0
Gold (tonnes) 63.0 62.0 57.7
Copper 143.9 146.6 158.3
Oil 30.6 23.4 19.4
Source: Papua New Guinea, 2000. Economic and Development Policies, Vol. 1, 2001 Budget, Government of
Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby:Table 4.
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Sovereign risk
There are several dimensions of sovereign
risk that affect the performance of the PNG
economy, and it appears that these have not
been adequately factored into past budgets.
They have likely also not been adequately
allowed for by those who have taken an
unduly optimistic view about the Morauta
Government’s ability to bring about
significant improvement in the performance
of the economy. That observers believe Papua
New Guinea’s sovereign risk has not
improved as is reflected in the downgrading
of its creditworthiness by Standard and Poor
on 7 August 2001. Standard and Poor
lowered Papua New Guinea’s foreign
currency sovereign credit rating from B+ to
B, and the long-term local currency sovereign
credit and senior unsecured debt ratings were
lowered from BB to BB-, which it was said
reflected ‘failure to attract new investment to
[Papua New Guinea’s] minerals sector at a
time when output is in secular decline…and
weakening growth prospects are
heightening popular resistance to economic
reform’ (Post Courier, 7 August 2001).
Standard and Poor also said that it expected
Papua New Guinea’s standby agreement
with the IMF to lapse in September.
Other signs of worsening sovereign risk
are the sharp decline in mining exploration,
and development and evidence of ‘high
grading’ by mining companies. BHP Billiton’s
withdrawal from the Ok Tedi mining venture
can also be viewed as based in part on an
assessment that the investment climate is not
going to improve, although environmental
issues were probably more decisive. The
decline in world metals prices could explain
some of the decline in exploration and
development. But exploration and develop-
ment in mining, oil and gas are at an all-time
low in Papua New Guinea, when oil prices
are substantially higher than in recent years.
OTML (Ok Tedi Mining Ltd) reported
higher grades in the last quarter of 2000 and
higher throughput (PNG Resources 2001).
Porgera Gold Mine also turned in a better-
than-expected performance in 2000 (gold
production up 15 per cent) due to ‘selective
mining’ and higher through put—from
139,384 ounces in 1999 to 182,087 ounces
in  2000  (PNG Resources 2001). Thes e
performances could indicate ‘high grading’
with a view to early exit because of increased
uncertainty. Chand (2001) shows theoretically
how increases in interest rates, indicating
higher sovereign risk, can lead to highgrading
of existing resource developments and
reduced investment in new developments.
Political instability has been long
recognised as a primary factor in the high
level of sovereign risk in Papua New Guinea.
The political instability translates into policy
instability, as well as poor governance—
including the politicisation of the public
service and corruption at high levels in the
government and in government bodies. The
Morauta Government has made the
reduction of political instability a major
policy objective. Hopefully, a major step has
been taken in the direction of reducing
political instability and its flow-on effects by
the passage of the Integrity of Political Parties
and Candidates Act in November 2000. If it
has had any positive effects in the short term,
however, they have not been reflected in
investor sentiment, or they have been
overshadowed by other circumstances.
As Standard and Poor’s comments
remind us, the resistance to the economic
reforms is growing, particularly resistance
to privatisation of public enterprises. The
apparently poor performance of the economy
so far this year could worsen if the global
downturn that is threatening takes hold. In
that case, commodity export prices will
deteriorate further and life could become
even harsher. Economic reform is difficult at
the best of times but a worsening economy
would make it even more difficult. In that
case, support of the international financial
agencies could well be withdrawn.
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The restoration of independence to the
Bank of Papua New Guniea has been another
major thrust in the government’s measures
to reduce sovereign risk. The passage of
amendments to the Central Banking Act
during 2000 have largely achieved this goal.
Central bank independence had been
seriously compromised with the sacking of
several Bank Governors in recent years.
The World Bank’s World Development
Report 2000/1 acknowledged for the first
time—on the World Bank’s part at least—
that a country’s macroeconomic management
may be made more difficult and its economic
growth reduced by the high level of instability
and uncertainty of primary commodity
prices. When a government’s budget is highly
dependent on a share of the revenues from
primary commodity exports—as is the case
in Papua New Guinea—in the absence of
special measures, year-to-year government
revenue may be highly unstable, which
makes budgeting for recurrent and
investment expenditure very difficult.
It is disappointing, therefore, that the
government has closed the Mineral Revenue
Stabilisation Fund (MRSF) and not replaced
its revenue stabilising, exchange rate
sterilising and savings functions with other
instruments. The mismanagement of the
MRSF has been well documented (AusAID
1995), including the changing of the
drawdown rules that effectively destroyed
the power of the Fund to stabilise revenues
going to the budget, in addition to
government borrowing against the funds
held in the Bank of Papua New Guinea after
1992. The ineffectiveness of the Fund could
have been avoided if independent trusteeship
had been possible and balances had been
retained in US dollar-denominated accounts.
Therefore, the instability of commodity
export revenues remains a problem. There
are various mechanisms that can be used to
smooth the flows to the budget. The MRSF-
type measure is an ex-post mechanism,
which stabilises the flow into the budget after
receipt of unstable export revenues.
Commodity market derivatives such as
futures, options and swaps can be used to
both smooth the export price fluctuations and
to reduce the uncertainty of the flows. Another
means of reducing uncertainty and stabilising
revenues is to have the mining or oil producer
guarantee the government a stable revenue
stream rather than the government sharing in
the price and production risks of export taxes
or royalties. A mining company is generally
in a better position to hedge these risks than
is the PNG government.
2001 expenditure performance
There are two main areas for improvement
in a government’s performance with respect
to the expenditure of revenues: loans and
grants. The first is the efficiency with which
the expenditure is carried out. The second is
the effectiveness of the expenditure in terms
of the prioritisation of the expenditure. The
efficiency of the government/bureaucracy
can be measured in terms of whether
expenditure is kept within budget and the
value-for-money of the expenditure. Value-
for-money may be measured in terms of input
indicators (which can be benchmarked over
time within a department, or across
departments) or in terms of performance or
outcomes. Such benchmarking has not been
a priority of past governments and it is too
early to see the impact of the Morauta
Government in terms of such measures.
However, while the impact of the
Morauta Government in terms of improving
the efficiency of government is difficult to
judge over so short a time span, one worrying
sign is that while total revenue and grants
for the 2000 Budget were higher than
expected by K179.3 million, total expenditure
was also higher than expected by K138.3
million. This tendency towards lack of
control over expenditure is one of long
standing (see Gupta 1995) and was not
corrected in 2000.
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The effectiveness of government may be
judged in terms of changes in the rate of
economic growth and how well it achieves
the equity or redistribution goals that it may
have set. One indication of a government’s
likely impact on effectiveness is change in
the priorities for allocation of expenditure.
Economic growth depends in part on public
investment in the highest return areas. Given
a focus on ‘quality’ growth, that is, growth
that will be strongly poverty-reducing, the
emphasis should be on public investment
that assists the poor—which is the bulk of
the PNG population—to participate as fully
as possible in the growth process.
The Morauta Government’s expressed
priorities for development expenditure have
been on ‘elementary and primary education,
primary health care, transport infrastructure
maintenance, law and order, and promotion
of income earning opportunities for local
entrepreneurs including agricultural
producers’ (Papua New Guinea 2000:
Foreword). Given that by far most of the poor
in Papua New Guinea are in rural areas and
have great difficulty in accessing education
and health services and markets because of
poor or non-existent transport infrastructure,
the emphasis on improving transport
infrastructure and education and health
services appears highly appropriate. The law-
and-order problems and the poor income-
earning performance in rural areas are
important too but are largely a function of the
poor infrastructure, education and health
services. While roads, particularly feeder
roads, are in a very poor state, requiring large
maintenance programs, it is disappointing
that provision for the development of new
roads to reach more of the isolated poor has
not been seen as a desirable goal.
The Morauta Government has lived up
to its promises of strengthening the Public
Investment Programme (PIP) in the form of
increasing the share of government
expenditure allocated to development. In
1998, the PIP share of expenditure was 6.6
per cent. In 1999, the share was increased to
8.6 per cent. In the 2001 Budget, the PIP share
was estimated at 9.7 per cent, while the
planned share for 2001 is 9.6 per cent. The
real tests of effectiveness, however, will be
whether the planned development spending
materialises, given the tendency for PIP
allocations to be the first to be held back when
projected revenues fail to eventuate and/or
recurrent spending balloons, and the
manner in which these funds are spent.
Unfortunately, development expenditure is
the main area for ‘grand corruption’ in
developing countries, mainly through over-
tendering in construction projects. A study
of a large number of developing countries
(Pritchett 1996) finds that, on average, each
public dollar invested created only 50 cents
of capital. This suggests  that public funds
are not invested wisely, but there must also
be a strong suspicion that there is substantial
theft of public funds.
Privatisation
A major part of the government’s reform
program is the privatisation of public
enterprises. Privatisation holds out the
prospects for considerable benefits. The
downside is that privatisation is one of the
more difficult types of reform for governments
to implement.
The sale of public enterprises in Papua
New Guinea’s case should have several
important benefits, notably
• improving services and reducing their
costs
• reducing the contingent liabilities of
government
• reducing scope for corruption
• paying down public debt
• reducing interest rates
• reducing the scope of tasks undertaken
by the public service to allow it to
concentrate on core activities
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• giving Papua New Guineans a
direct stake in the companies and
thereby improving transparency and
accountability.
It is surely beyond argument that
essential services (such as power, water and
telecommunications) and other services
such as air services, insurance and financial
services are highly inefficient and very costly,
leading to business costs being very high
(Duncan and Lawson 1997). Papua New
Guinea’s publiclyowned enterprises have
had to receive government support
(particularly Air Niugini). Their operation
therefore represents a contingent liability for
government that is not budgeted for and has
been a source of budget over-runs (notably
the PNG Banking Corporation).
On taking office, the Morauta Government
put forward as a major reason for the sale of
public enterprises the opportunity to reduce
public debt and thereby reduce interest rates.
This is a worthy aim. However, it appears that
because of inefficient operation and
maladministration, the enterprises are
unlikely to yield anywhere near the amounts
that were anticipated. But this also makes
nonsense of the argument by the ‘anti-
privatisers’ that the country’s valuable ‘public
assets’ should not be sold off. Still, the fact
that the sale of the enterprises will not realise
the benefits thought possible in terms of debt
repayment and interest rate reduction is not a
reason for not going ahead with privatisation.
Other benefits in terms of reducing costs of
services and improving services to the public
and business, reducing scope for corruption,
reducing contingent liabilities and
concentrating public service resources on core
government activities are more than sufficient
reason to go ahead. Unfortunately, there has
not been the progress anticipated with
privatisation. To date no sales have gone
ahead, so the debt pay-down anticipated in
the budget has not been achieved. This puts a
hole in the budget that will have to be met by
further borrowing or reduced expenditure.
As stated above, reform of government
business enterprises is one of the most
difficult of reform activities. One of the main
reasons for the difficulty is that the costs of
adjustment—especially in terms of the loss
of employment by both management and
employees—are immediate and obvious,
while the benefits that flow on to businesses,
consumers and taxpayers are not obvious
and may not be immediate. Another
important and related reason that applies in
Papua New Guinea as in many other
countries is that public service unions are in
a powerful position to resist the reform. Those
resisting the reform are able to appeal to
strong emotional notions such as ‘selling the
country’s assets that have been paid for by
our taxes’.
Where a particular reform is difficult to
implement, one strategy that can be adopted
to make the reform possible is to present it as
part of a package of reforms that offers
compensating benefits to those likely to suffer
from the privatisation (see Haggard and
Webb 1996). Haggard and Webb suggest that
compensation in the form of education or
health measures is better than subsidy
mechanisms such as hiring incentives for
employers, as once implemented, subsidies
are usually difficult to remove. Unfortunately,
given Papua New Guinea’s parlous
economic state, the possibility of offering
compensating measures is financially
difficult.
A second important lesson from the
economic reforms carried out worldwide
over the past 20 years or so is that reform is
more easily implemented if there is
‘ownership’ of the reform (see OECD 1996;
World Bank 1996). This means that there
should be education of the public about the
benefits and costs of the reforms. In particular,
public sector unions should be closely
involved in the discussions about
implementation of the reforms and the best
way to handle the adjustment costs for the
labour employed in the enterprises being
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privatised. In addition, parties that are likely
to benefit from the restructuring should be
included in the discussions to highlight the
benefits that will flow.
The opposition to the privatisation in
Papua New Guinea has been considerable.
In part this may have been because the
program was too ambitious. But it also seems
that the public was not convinced of the
benefits of the reform. In the upcoming
election, privatisation is likely to be a major
issue. There is a significant danger that
attitudes against privatisation will harden
and it will be seen as too difficult to carry
forward in the next government. Failure to
carry through with the privatisation program
risks the IMF and World Bank withdrawing
their support of the PNG government.
Market perceptions of
the economy
With the unavoidable delay involved in
obtaining statistics, such as output and
employment, on how well the economy has
performed over a period, useful ‘real time’
indicators of how the economy is doing are
prices or other indicators that reflect how
economic agents feel. Share prices, exchange
rates and interest rates are such market
indicators, as are foreign reserves, credit
ratings and inflation rates. For a mining-
intensive economy such as Papua New
Guinea, minerals, oil and gas exploration
and development is a useful barometer of
investors’ perceptions about the economy
and government policies.
These ‘market’ indicators offer a very
mixed perception of the PNG economy in
2001. On the positive side, interest rates (as
reflected in 182-day Treasury Bills) have
fallen fairly steadily since late 1999—from
20.58 per cent in September 1999 to 12.34 per
cent in June 2001. Relatedly, since January
2000 commercial bank deposit rates (180
days) have fallen from 16.77 per cent to 8.53
per cent in June 2001. Bank of Papua New
Guinea holdings of foreign reserves and gold
have also increased steadily since July 1999
to where in June 2001 they stood at K1,092
million (equivalent to 4.6 months of imports).
Papua New Guinea’s inflation rate is
measured by an urban-focused consumer
price index (CPI) based on outdated weights
from a mid 1970s survey. Following the
restoration of macroeconomic stability in
1995–96, the rate fell to 3.9 per cent in 1997. It
then accelerated to 13.6 per cent in 1998 and
14.9 per cent in 1999 as the kina depreciated.
Consumption has a high import content, and
inflation tends to track the kina–US dollar
exchange rate. Introduction of the value-added
tax in mid 1999 had a one-off impact on the
CPI that was offset in part by tariff reductions.
The year-on-year (average of 2000 on
average of 1999) ‘headline’ inflation for 2000,
as measured by the CPI, was 15.6 per cent,
compared to 14.9 per cent in 1999. The
increase in the headline inflation in 2000 was
recorded in all expenditure groups due to
the depreciation of the kina, an increase in
public service wages of 5 per cent, the impact
of excise duty on cigarettes and tobacco, and
increases in the prices of several price-
controlled items.
The ‘underlying’ rate of inflation, which
excludes the effects of government policy
decisions on consumer goods such as the
changes in excise rates, increased by 11.8 per
cent in 2000, compared to 16 per cent in 1999.
The lower inflation in 2000 was attributed to
the decline in the price of cereal, household
items, miscellaneous food, and soft and
alcoholic drinks. Inflation has continued to
fall in 2001 with year-on-year inflation to June
2001 registering 7.9 per cent (Post Courier, 5
September 2001).
Other indicators, however, give a
strongly negative indication of investors’
perceptions. The value of the kina has fallen
substantially since 1999, although
significantly more in terms of US dollars than
in terms of Australian dollars or Japanese
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yen—reflecting the appreciation of the US
dollar against most currencies. The kina was
at a low point of US¢33.75 in September 1999
(A¢51.69) following a long slide from
US¢47.70 (A¢77.66) in December 1998. The
kina recovered for a few months after
September 1999 in the wake of the
Supplementary Budget and the agreement on
the structural adjustment program, but fell
again to US¢32.10 (A¢50.42) in January 2000.
From this low point, it rose to US¢41.10
(A¢71.67) in May 2000, but since that point
steadily declined to break below the US¢30
level in recent months. This slide in the face of
the build-up in foreign reserves is puzzling
but, in part, is likely to be due to continued
capital flight in the form not so much of foreign
investors withdrawing but of Papua New
Guineans themselves investing elsewhere.
Another negative indicator is the decline
in the price of PNG mining stocks. In August
this year, the share price of the oil explorer
and producer Oil Search Ltd (a partner with
Exxon Mobil in the Hides Gas project) was
trading at a six-year low. The shares of Orogen
Minerals Ltd were also trading at their lowest
price for some time, and, as for Oil Search
Ltd, this was largely because of the failure to
find new oil fields to compensate for
declining production from Kutubu. The
Highlands Pacific share price fall is due to
the lack of a partner to develop its Ramu
nickel project. That is due, in part, to the low
nickel prices because of over-production.
Lihir Gold’s price has recovered somewhat
but remains below its issue price in 1995 of
A$1.50. The collapse of exploration and
development in mining reflects the loss of
interest in mining in Papua New Guinea, not
so much because of poor prospectivity, but
because of perceived risks, particularly
disputes over land. This may explain why
exploration and development has declined,
yet the country’s risk premium as reflected
in the rate of interest appears to have fallen.
But the most devastating indicator of
all is Standard and Poor’s downgrading
of Papua New Guinea’s creditworthiness.
The downgrade is devastating because it
comes after the Morauta Government has
made a huge effort to improve the
investment environment. The downgrade
noted the Bank of Papua New Guinea
Governor’s recent revision of the expected
GDP for 2001 from the 2001 Budget forecast
to 0.1 per cent and the opposition to
privatisation that the poor growth was
generating. It also noted the lack of
investment in mining.
The fact that the country’s oil production
has fallen so fast in the past two years is most
unusual in a country as prospective as Papua
New Guinea.2  Most oil-producing countries
maintain proven oil reserves at around the
same level over many years. Looked at from
this point of view, oil reserves seem to be an
economic indicator rather than a reflection
of the quantity of oil in the ground. Thus it is
hard to believe that the fall in oil production
is due to anything other than perceptions of
investment risk.
BHP Billiton’s willingness to walk away
from the Ok Tedi mine when it is supposedly
entering its most profitable phase is another
negative indicator of the mining environment
in Papua New Guinea. The intention is to
transfer BHP Billiton’s 52 per cent share into
a trust for the people of Western Province.
Such a trust fund is in principle a good idea.
It gives the people of the Province a stake in
the company and thereby should reduce
compensation claims against the mine. It
should also provide a source of revenue for
the Province. However, the key issue will be
how well the trust fund is managed and the
manner in which the earnings from the trust
are used. The fund should be under
independent management to ensure its
integrity. The earnings from the fund may be
distributed in a collective manner through
investment in public infrastructure and
expenditure on public services. Or they may
be distributed to individuals, as is done in
the case of Alaskan oil revenues held in trust.
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This latter is not a suggestion to be shrugged
off as there is considerable evidence that
individuals spend much more wisely than
governments do.
While the evidence suggests that
investors have lost confidence in the
economy, this is difficult to confirm. One
measure that has been developed of the
confidence that people have in a country’s
effectiveness in upholding their property and
contractual rights is the contract-intensive
money (CIM) index (Clague et al. 1999). The
CIM index is defined as the ratio of non-
currency money to total money s upply (M2).
The rationale for the index is that if people
lose confidence in a country’s institutions to
provide assurance for the security of property
(for example, in terms of adequate third party
enforcement) the index will fall. That is, they
would prefer to hold their financial assets
other than in deposits in banks. The higher
the CIM, the greater the ability of firms to raise
capital, the higher the rate of investment, and
the higher the rate of growth.
The CIM for Papua New Guinea
calculated for the period 1981–2001 (June
quarter) is seen in Figure 1. It shows an
upward trend in the ratio, with a dip
coinciding with the fiscal crisis following the
closure of the Panguna mine. The index
recovers and increases during the Wingti and
Chan administrations. Then there is a
relatively large drop coinciding with the
Skate Administration. In 2000 and up to June
2001, there is a recovery in the ratio to a level
higher than previously. Hence, on the basis
of this test, the Morauta Government is
performing well.
Conclusions
The Morauta Government, coming to office
with such high hopes riding on its shoulders,
has seen the economy do very poorly in 2001.
Figure 1 The CIM ratio for Papua New Guinea, 1981–2001 (per cent)
Source: ADB Database (http://www.adb.org); Bank of PNG (various issues, 1998–2001). Quarterly
Economic Bulletin Vol.XXIX No.1, Bank of PNG, Port Moresby.
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This poor performance in 2001 has occurred
despite strong efforts by the government to
improve the economic environment through
reform of institutions and policies. The
economy did well in 2000 with real GDP
increasing by 3.3 per cent, despite a 7.9 per
cent fall in real GDP from the mining sector.
Inflation and interest rates were reduced in
2000 and the exchange rate stabilised as
foreign reserves increased.
However, in 2001 total real GDP is at best
likely to show no growth and could even
decline by 2–3 per cent, especially if global
economic conditions deteriorate as widely
expected. With population increasing by
2.5–2.7 per cent, this means a 2.5–6 per cent
decline in real GDP per capita. Foreign
reserves have continued to increase and
interest rates have continued to fall.
However, the exchange rate has depreciated
throughout the year, plans for privatisation
have not been implemented, investment
plans for major resource developments have
not been advanced, mining exploration and
development has fallen to very low levels,
investors are pessimistic about the mining
sector as reflected in the low level of share
prices, and Papua New Guinea’s
creditworthiness has been downgraded.
The reasons for the seeming collapse in
confidence in the PNG economy are not easy
to pinpoint. It may be speculated that because
cynicism about corruption in the government
and in government agencies appears to be
running at an all-time high level, trust in the
government is at a low level. This lack of trust
is making it very difficult to move ahead with
privatisation of government businesses.
Privatisation is difficult to implement at the
best of times. Under present circumstances
the privatisation program may be far too
ambitious, especially as it is likely to become
a key election issue.
If privatisation does not go ahead,
financial support of the international
agencies is likely to dry up. The absence of
funds from privatisation and the loss of
international support will cause problems
in financing what already appears to be a
rapidly deteriorating budget deficit. This
would come on top of a developing budget
problem that has arisen because of optimistic
forecasts of primary commodity exports and
export prices, and optimistic forecasts of
GDP growth and therefore of taxation
revenue. The deficit could be even further
aggravated if the government has not been
able to bring under control the tendency for
departments to spend in excess of their
allocation. Thus expectations about the fiscal
situation may be a factor underlying the
depreciating exchange rate.
Notes
1 The decline in the value of the kina vis-à-vis
the US dollar accounted for almost all of the
increase in the external public debt from
K1.9 billion in June 1997 to K3.1 billion in
June 1999.
2 For the eight-month period to August 2001,
oil production was reported to be down
15 per cent on the previous year (Post Courier,
5 September 2001).
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